THE EVIDENCE SHELL PAID $15.5 MIL USD TO KEEP A JURY FROM SEEING

OVERVIEW
When Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni began accusing Shell of operating in collusion with the Nigerian military to suppress dissent, Shell consistently and categorically denied the fact to its shareholders, to the press and to the public. Shell denies it to this day.

In a press conference to ‘refute the inaccuracies’ of an article by the Sunday Times, former Director of Shell Nigeria Brian Anderson claimed that “We have played no part in any military operations against the Ogoni people, or any other communities in the Niger Delta, and we have never been approached for financial or logistical support for any action.”Anderson conceded that Shell had paid the military, but only on two occasions and then cast doubt on whether human rights abuses occurred on either of these occasions.

In fact, Shell’s involvement with the Nigerian military was routine and the documentary evidence reveals a troubling pattern of aiding and abetting notoriously abusive armed police and soldiers who violently suppressed nonviolent opposition to Shell’s operations.

In addition to the confidential memos, faxes, and other documents, witnesses formerly employed by Shell have made sworn statements about the collusion. An ex-Shell police officer testified in a sworn deposition that Nigerian soldiers, en route to Ogoni stayed at Shell facilities and used the Shell police bus for transport. The witness also saw the heavily armed Mobile Police Force (MOPOL) being transported in Shell helicopters, who also stayed at the Bonny terminal. Another ex-Shell police officer who also serves with MOPOL recounts his superior being given a bulky envelope by Shell staff, which he assumes contained the cash allowances distributed to the soldiers shortly after. He is told by an officer that the Ogoni are being “taught a lesson” for resisting Shell and by another officer that they should not “leave any of the persons alive.”

Below is a small selection of some of the documents and depositions that the plaintiffs have used to make their case against Shell. This is just a portion of the evidence that would have been brought before a jury in the trial that was called off after the plaintiffs accepted a compensation payment of $15.5 million USD to settle the case.

SHELL’S COLLUSION WITH THE NIGERIAN MILITARY

***ALL REFERENCED DOCUMENTS BELOW ARE AVAILABLE AS PDFS– CLICK ON EXHIBIT # TO DOWNLOAD– A FURTHER DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IS ALSO AVAILABLE ON THE WEBSITE OF THE U.S DISTRICT COURT; CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFORMATION.

EXHIBIT 19: Request for MOPOL
October 29, 1990- Shell Petroleum Development Company letter to Commissioner of Police of Rivers State formally requesting security protection at Umuechem ahead of “an impending attack” by the local community, “preferably Mobile Police Force.”
The Mobile Police (MOPOL) are notorious for committing human rights abuses & known locally as the ‘kill & go’ police. During the peaceful demonstration on Oct. 31, MOPOL shot and killed 80 unarmed protesters, and destroyed nearly 500 houses. An official government inquiry after the incident found no threat of violence from the villagers.

EXHIBIT 60: Watts, Achebe & Shonkan et al.
May 11, 1993 - High level lobbying for security protection.
Notes on a series of meetings between Sir Phillip Watts (Managing Director, Shell Nigeria), Emeka Achebe (General Manager, Shell Nigeria) and the Interim President of Nigeria, Ernest Shonekan, Inspector General of Police and Director General of State Security Services. On April 30 1993, Ogoni villagers peacefully protesting against the bulldozing of their farms for the laying of Shell pipelines were shot by Mobile Police. Karalolo Kogbara, one of the Plaintiffs in the Wiwa v. Shell case, lost her arm. Less than two weeks later, Shell met with the Director General of the State Security Services to “reiterate our request for support from the army and police.” It notes that “He brought up the Ogoni issue saying it would be under control very shortly.” Following this, the document warns that “we will have to encourage follow through into real action preferably on an industry rather than Shell only basis.” The document concludes with: “No reference to this message should be quoted… unless most confidential.”

EXHIBIT 61: Anderson Fax 12 August 1994
August 12, 1994- High level request for security forces
Fax from Brian Anderson (head of Shell Nigeria), to colleagues in London & the Hague. Details a request for “security force protective screen” & “military guard.” Anderson notes that this request “impinges on our ‘no military protection’ stance.” (Page 2)

[PUBLIC DOCUMENT]: Okuntimo Memo
By all accounts, Chairman of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force Major Paul Okuntimo led the brutal campaign of violence to crush the Ogoni opposition to Shell. Interviewed by The Sunday Times (UK), Okuntimo admitted to being paid by Shell: “Shell contributed to the logistics through financial support. To do that, we needed resources and Shell provided these.” He later denied the comments.
In an internal memo from April 21, 1994 and stamped “RESTRICTED,” Chairman of Rivers State Internal Security Force Major Paul Okuntimo writes:
“Observations:”
– “Shell operations still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken…”
“Recommendations/Strategies:”
– “Wasting operations during MOSOP and other gatherings making constant military presence justifiable”
– “Wasting targets cutting across communities and leadership cadres especially vocal individuals…”
– “Wasting operations coupled with psychological tactics of displacement/wasting as noted above
“Financial Implications (Estimates/Funding):”
– “Pressure on oil companies for prompt regular inputs as discussed”

EXHIBIT 31: Shell Nigeria (SPDC) memo requests payment for soldiers whose military operations to survey the “state of oil installations” in one area resulted in the shooting death of an Ogoni man by the unit’s leader, Rivers State Internal Security Task Force chief Major Paul Okuntimo. The memo recommends an “honorarium as a show of gratitude and motivation for a sustained favourable disposition towards SPDC in future assignments.”

EXHIBIT 66: Anderson Fax, May 2, 1994
In this fax from Brian Anderson to senior colleagues in London and the Hague, dated May 4, 1994, Anderson details a long meeting with Nigerian dictator General Sani Abacha, at the end of which, on page 5, Anderson exchanged contact details with the Head of State, who gave him 2 personal telephone numbers.

EXHIBIT 70: Anderson Fax, May 20, 1994
In this fax from Brian Anderson to senior colleagues in London and the Hague, dated 20th May 1994, Anderson refers to the handling of the Ogoni crisis in the media, giving his opinion that Shell should cooperate closely with the Nigerian government and ‘give HOS [Head of State General Sani Abacha] the requisite intelligence as it comes to us’.

DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 4:
Deposition of Eebu Jackson Nwiyon, a Mobile Police Force (MOPOL) soldier and Shell SPY (Shell supernumerary police) officer who served in Ogoni describes being told how his fellow soldiers were being paid by Shell, recounts boarding a Shell helicopter at a Shell installation with other heavily-armed soldiers. He recounts his superior being given a bulky envelope by Shell staff, which he assumes contained the cash allowances distributed to the soldiers shortly after. He is told by an officer that the Ogoni are being “taught a lesson” for resisting Shell. He recounts Major Okuntimo telling him that if they encounter any resistance to  not “leave any of the persons alive.”

DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 11:
Deposition of Vincent Tormebamri Nwidoh: ‘Shell police’ charge room officer. Shell allowed heavily armed MOPOL to use its Bonny Terminal.

DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 16:
Deposition of Israel Nwidor
Sightings of Shell helicopter before an assault on Ken Saro-Wiwa’s home village of Bane in Ogoni. Account of Okuntimo’s torture & cruelty to detainees. He spent 6 weeks at Bori camp, in a packed cell opposite Ken Saro-Wiwa’s cell.

DEPOSITION EXHIBIT 19:
Deposition of Blessing Israel
Shell police beat him upon finding out he is Ogoni: “This is not ordinary police station, this is Shell police station.” He is put in same cell as some of the OGONI 9 in Bori Camp. He ultimately spent 18 months in the State Investigation and Interrogation Bureau prison cell.

DISINFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE, & PUBLIC RELATIONS

Below are some documents that relate to Shell’s shameful campaign of disinformation to discredit, split and vilify Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, and various individuals and groups that supported their nonviolent struggle. The documents also show how Shell intended to manage public relations around the conviction and execution of the Ogoni 9. Besides witness testimony alleging Shell’s involvement in bribery to encourage perjured testimony against Ken Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues to assure a conviction, documents clearly show that Shell executives had advance warning about the outcomes of the rigged tribunal trying the Ogoni men.

EXHIBIT 72: Nigeria Update June 1994
In this fax from Brian Anderson, ex-Director of Shell Nigeria, to colleagues in London & the Hague, Anderson was willing to go along with intelligence from the British High Commission (BHC) that cast Saro-Wiwa as a trouble-maker involved in the murder of four Ogoni chiefs at Giokoo. BHC intelligence claims there is good reason to arrest Ken Saro-Wiwa, and Saro-Wiwa’s deputy instructed killings which, Anderson claims, “shows the reality of this peace-loving man”.

EXHIBIT 55: Nigeria Update April 1995
In this fax from Anderson to colleagues in London & the Hague, Anderson is aware that Shell’s most vocal critic, Saro-Wiwa, was likely to be found guilty by a military tribunal, 7 months before the sentencing. In Anderson’s words, the BHC believes that “although the charges [against Saro-Wiwa] should not stick, the  government will make sure he is found guilty and then sentenced to death, and reprieved but incarcerated for a very long time”. (page 2)

EXHIBIT 50: Anderson Fax, July 23, 1995
Anderson relays a meeting with military dictator Gen. Sani Abacha, in which they discuss, on page 8, how to explain Shell’s association with military action in public. Anderson is effectively told to expect a death sentence for Ken Saro-Wiwa. Anderson concludes that Shell should prepare for a conviction.

EXHIBIT 132: Letters to Nigerian Ministers, both June 13 1995,
Two letters from Brian Anderson to Nigeria’s Minister for Petroleum and Minister for Information, requesting interviews with them for a Shell PR film, in response to recent negative publicity (two documentaries, Drilling Fields and Delta Force by Glen Ellis for Channel 4).

EXHIBIT 67: Anderson fax, April 25, 1994
‘Please note the attached note from the BHC regarding Body Shop’s visit to Rivers State which they have called off after being refused visas’

EXHIBIT 102: Anderson fax, April 5, 1994
‘The Body Shop are apparently still trying to arrange for a “fact finding” visit here, and are in touch now with the BHC…given the tremendous sensitivity of the Ogoni and oil producing community issues here at this time, I would really much prefer that Bodyshop looked elsewhere!’

EXHIBIT 6: Nigeria Issue, Strategy and Action Plans
In the wake of the execution of the Ogoni 9, Shell aims to monitor & cultivate relationships with supportive NGOs, churches and groups in order to boost Shell’s reputation amongst their constituency audiences. Overall this plan is designed to weaken and isolate the ‘hard-core campaigners’, which include Bodyshop, Sierra Club and Rainforest Action Network. Shell aims to work with Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Living Eath, Pro Natura, and others. The strategy recommends “social contact between senior editorial figures and CMD [Committee of Managing Directors]” as a part of media relations.

EXHIBIT 89: Note for Information- Nigeria
Pg. 3- ‘Until late 1994 the strategy for handling the issue was to “starve it of oxygen” and respond to enquiries as fully as possible through letters, publications and personal briefings’
A new video…Heartbeat of Nigeria made by an independent film-maker on behalf of SPDC, is seen as a key part of the communications ‘tool kit’.
Pg. 4- ‘The Group could be vulnerable if the issue builds up in a country…A failure to monitor public opinion could be a contributory factor.’

EXHIBIT 108: Background to the Nigeria Issue
Pg. 13- Listed under ‘Threats’ is the concern that: ‘Our present communications strategy could be construed as green imagery’
Pg. 15- ‘concentrate on developing personal relationships with key NGOs in Europe, e.g. UNPO, Amnesty International and WIP, based on mutual trust and a clear understanding of the direction the campaign may be taking, thereby enhancing our ability to influence their thinking… A number of NGOs will, therefore, be invited to visit Shell operations for themselves’. Shell will steer these NGOs towards moderate “senior citizens”.

EXHIBIT 139: Nigeria Update, Dec. 11, 1995
Pg. 5- ‘We should seriously consider putting some Group money into the Washington lobby group that Mobil et al is involved with. We cannot participate ourselves but I do believe that we should help them.’
(Ex-Director of Shell Nigera, Brian Anderson is keen to consider high level political lobbying).

EXHIBIT 136: Anderson Memo, Sept. 23, 1996
An office memo from Brian Anderson to colleagues in Nigeria & Europe, dated 23 Sept, 1996 regarding a CNN programme on Ogoni. Anderson asks his colleagues ‘Do I need to discuss with HoS [Head of State Gen. Sani Abacha] before I go on CNN?’

SHELL’S DAMMING INTERNAL “FLARING FILES”

Internal company documents released during the Wiwa Versus Shell court case paint a damming picture of Shell’s response to the issue of  gas flaring in Nigeria.

EXHIBIT 36. A confidential Chief Executives Performance Appraisal for 1991, produced in May 1992, noted that the “Environment” “represents a major challenge with many years to catch up”.

EXHIBIT 35: As international pressure grew against the company, the Shell Group lowered its environmental standards. One confidential Environmental Management Audit for Shell Expo, written in June 1994, noted that Shell’s “policy aim ‘To eliminate emissions, effluents and discharges that are known to have a negative effect on the environment’ has been abandoned.” Shell’s audit team said it could be “interpreted as a retrograde step”.

The documents reveal the company cared more for brutal economics rather than the environment when it came to putting the flares out. “It is essential that SPDC maintains the objective of making a reasonable return on investment to put out the flares rather than it being a cost to the oil sector,” the 1991 Performance Appraisal document said.

EXHIBIT 91:  By 1994 Shell privately admitted that its Nigerian subsidiary called SPDC had ageing and polluting infrastructure that was “unacceptable.” One document noted “Key aspects of the past environmental practices of the SPDC operation also fall short of current standards and leave a significant legacy of problems to be resolved”. Top of the list of problems to be fixed was flaring of associated gas.

Back in the 1990s, the internal Shell documents said that the LNG project at Bonny would “create an additional market for gas”, but would initially be supplied by non-associated gas, with associated becoming an “increasing component”. However, this latter option was “made unattractive by the lack of adequate incentives or compensation.”

EXHIBIT ONE: Even when the government did introduce fiscal incentives to reduce flaring, Shell conceded it had not “resulted in appreciable flaring reduction due to the lack of a conducive commercial framework”.

Shell’s confidential Country Business Plan for 1996, produced just months before Saro-Wiwa’s execution, even modelled extinguishing the flares by 2000. The modelling showed that “unconstrained flaring” actually increased the value of the company, compared to switching the flares out by 2000. The company said the exercise was only “indicative”,  but the 2000 date for extinguishing flares was quietly dropped. It would be the first of many missed deadlines.

EXHIBIT 96: But the company knew it was “no longer acceptable to plan to continue gas flaring”. The internal documents show that SPDC was now responsible for 12 per cent of world-wide flaring. The company dropped attempting to extinguish flares by 2000 and instead proposed a “Flares Out by 2005” campaign.

Even that deadline slipped, as other deadlines were proposed by Shell that were also broken.

So the flaring continues some fifty years after oil production started.